BEIRUT, Lebanon - Hezbollah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah declared Monday that his guerrillas achieved a “strategic, historic victory” against Israel.

Nasrallah, speaking on the day a cease-fire took effect - ending 34 days of fighting between Hezbollah and Israel - called Monday “a great day.”

“We are today before a strategic, historic victory, without exaggeration,” the leader of the Shiite militant group said in a taped speech on Hezbollah’s al-Manar TV.

Nasrallah also promised Hezbollah would help the Lebanese people rebuild.

“The enemy destroyed thousands of houses in the south, the Bekaa and the southern suburbs,” he said.

Associated Press

The world’s focus right now is on the cease-fire deal in the Middle East. We think that’s the incorrect focus. The real focus should be on an earthquake that has shaken the region: Hezbollah’s forces, even if they are defeated by Israel in southern Lebanon, will have shown themselves capable of mounting an effective resistance for an extended period of time. The Israelis have not been able to deal them a single, sharp blow and fragment them.

A single assumption has shaped Arab-Israeli relations since 1948: that Israel could decide, if it wished, to resort to war and impose its will on Arab armies. That assumption shaped all political considerations in the region. If Israel is no longer capable of doing that, it follows that a range of political assumptions also are untrue. Consider Jordan: Since 1970, Israel has been the guarantor of Jordanian national security. Consider Egypt: Since Camp David, Egypt has refused to engage Israel militarily. Both of these political certainties have been based on a military certainty — and if that dissolves, so does everything else.

Hezbollah has been fighting a simple, conventional war. It has relied on fortifications, pre-positioned supplies and motivated troops. Israel has sought to defeat Hezbollah without incurring extensive casualties. The first strategy was the air campaign. The second strategy was a complex warfighting/diplomacy strategy designed to achieve Israel’s ends without having to systematically destroy Hezbollah. The end result of this strategy — if it is carried out to its logical conclusion — is that Hezbollah will have fought and survived, and that in fighting, it will have shaped Israeli political decisions. In other words, we will have moved from a world in which Israel’s military force trumps all other considerations to a world in which Israeli military power is circumscribed by Arab power.

If Hezbollah merely survives as both a political and military organization, it can claim victory. The result may be the expansion of the party’s authority over the political system, thanks to its weaponry and its considerable sway over the Lebanese Army, which has a substantial Shiite base. This, in turn, might lead to a solidification of Iranian influence and the restoration of Syrian influence….

As the violence continues, retribution is in the air. Israel has focused its attacks on Shiites, leaving Sunni, Christian and Druse areas (though not their long-term welfare) relatively intact. Amid all the destruction, many a representative of the March 14 movement has denounced Hezbollah’s ‘‘adventurism,’’ provoking Shiite resentment. As one Hezbollah combatant recently told The Guardian: ‘‘The real battle is after the end of this war. We will have to settle score with the Lebanese politicians. We also have the best security and intelligence apparatus in this country, and we can reach any of those people who are speaking against us now. Let’s finish with the Israelis, and then we will settle scores later.’’