The belated offing of al-Zarqawi is worth a toast in itself, but its strategic significance for the war is another matter.
For it is primarily not Jihadi Salafists (or as they prefer to call themselves, ‘mujahideen’) that blow stuff up in Iraq. It is more prosaic-minded Iraqi Sunnis, often associated with the former Baathist elite, that just resent the Shia government and the de facto occupation.
Indeed, the so-called Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda, which Zarqawi is supposed to have led at least until recently, is a weak and tattered organization with a terrible image. A document captured by commandos of the Task Force 145 in an April 16 raid laments its deep inferiority vis-a-vis its enemies in Baghdad. There is a massive deficit of organization, supplies, men, media savvy, and workable plan, according to Centcom’s purported translation of the memorandum.
As to Zarqawi himself, he must have been a real pain in the behind for his uneasy allies like al-Zawihiri, who — still according to the Coalition — sent him an admonishing letter of instruction last July. The note complains that Zarqawi’s all-consuming hatred of Shias and outlandish savagery only serve to alienate Iraqis, and other Muslims, from the mujahideen. In April, Huthayfah Azzam, son of the legendary jihadi Abdullah Azzam, claimed that Zarqawi had been relieved of his command as chief of operations after his disastrous suicide bombing campaign in Amman.
Whether that be the case or not, I concur with Spencer Ackerman in The New Republic: the biggest beneficiary of Zarqawi’s death may very well be al-Qaeda.